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The European Union’s Council Regulation on support for rural development by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development has introduced auctioning as a new 
instrument for granting agri-environmental payments and awarding conservation 
contracts for the recent multi-annual budgetary plan. This paper therefore deals with the 
conception and results of two case study auctions for conservation contracts. Results of 
two field experiments show much differentiated bid prices in the model-region and 
budgetary cost-effectiveness gains of up to 21% in the first auction and up to 36% in the 
repeated auction. Besides these promising results, some critical aspects as well as 
lessons to be learned will also be discussed in this paper to improve the design and 
performance of upcoming conservation auctions. 
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Since the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, agri-
environmental schemes have been supported by the EU within the framework of the 
second pillar of the CAP. In this context, it is the norm that ecological services provided 
by agriculture are predominantly rewarded action-orientated and by the use of a single, 
fixed payment for compliance with a predetermined combination of management 
prescriptions. Even though the discussion concerning the use of economic instruments 
in environmental policy has already expanded in the 1990s, the diffusion of innovative 
policy design had been slow. Most states had still relied on regulatory, not on market-
based policies and even though this strategy had yielded some success, it became clear 
that market-based strategies and instruments could be more effective for certain 
applications (Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge, 2003).  
In the case of plant biodiversity in Europe the problem of increasingly endangered 
biodiversity is to a growing extent recognised, but the question of how to address this 
challenge appropriately has yet to be answered (Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003). One of 
the suggested approaches is the strengthening of incentive measures and market-
creation. The European Union’s Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for 
rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 
has introduced auctioning as a new instrument for granting agri-environmental 
payments and awarding conservation contracts for the current multi-annual budgetary 
plan (article 39, Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005). However, in the range of 
policy options aimed at the conservation and protection of biological diversity, market-
based instruments have only recently gained more attention. The implementation of this 
institutional reorientation in Europe is still characterised by a serve shortage of 
knowledge and practical experiences.  
Since 1986 the U.S. Department of Agriculture has been awarding land retirement 
contracts for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) based on a competitive bidding 
mechanism. Farmers bid to obtain CRP cost share assistance, which is allocated to them 
based on a so-called Environmental Benefits Index (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988; 
Szentandrasi et al., 1995; Babcock et al., 1996; Smith, 2003). In Australia, auctions are 
used in areas such as salinity control, nutrient control and conservation of native 
vegetation where land use change is required to accomplish environmental improvement 
as part of the BushTender trials and other projects as part of the Market-based 
Instruments Pilot Program (Stoneham et al., 2003; Grafton, 2005; National Market  
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Based Instrument Working Group, 2005). In Europe, a conservation scheme combining 
auctioning and fixed-price payments had been used in two counties in the state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Germany (Holm-Müller and Hilden, 2004). Moreover, the Challenge 
Fund in the UK was based on auctioning to encourage additional afforestiation on 
private areas (CJC Consulting, 2004). 
The case study presented in this paper focuses the specific mechanism of auctioning 
conservation contracts in biodiversity protection efforts. The survey mainly sets out to 
discuss the first sole real-life implementation of auctioning plant biodiversity on 
grassland sites in Europe within a case study area in Germany. Due to restriction and 
necessary compromises as part of an interdisciplinary research project, the case study 
auctions could not completely be designed according to theoretical evident guidelines 
and in a way the author would have done independently from an environmental and 
resource economist’s point of view. These aspects will also be reflected briefly in the 
remainder of the paper.  
The paper is structured as follows. The second section takes a brief look at general 
considerations on the application of auctioning conservation contracts. Section three 
presents the case study background. The main results of both field experiments are 
discussed in the fourth section. Section five concludes and briefly highlights additional 
need for research.  
 
2. Auctioning conservation contracts  
2.1 Main considerations  
The potential benefit of auctions in allocating contracts is evident and well analysed by 
auction theory (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Latacz-Lohmann and 
Van der Hamsvoort, 1998; Klemperer, 1999; Klemperer, 2002; Krishna, 2002; Chan et 
al. 2003; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003). The main reason why auctions are of interests in 
this case is the presence of an information asymmetry between the farmers and the 
administration (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997). This is the case since 
these goods and services are often generated by lands that are private property. A 
farmer, in this case, usually knows his own land as the base of production opportunities 
better than any public agency (Fraser, 1995; Wu and Babcock, 1996). Landowners will 
therefore calculate based on their individual costs and a price for the trades goods will 
emerge, which enables a more efficient use of public funds as if the administration 
would fix flat-rate payments without considering differences in the farmers’ production  
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costs. From a policy-maker’s point of view, auctions to buy ecological services from 
landowners focus on budgetary cost-effectiveness and the possibility to gather 
information about the production costs of agricultural firms.  
Standard selling auctions can be adopted as procurement or reverse auctions, like in the 
case of auctioning ecological services. But as especially Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 
(2005) point out, auctions for ecological services differ from basic auction design in 
many respects. Thus auction theory is not well developed for this kind of specific 
auctioning and offers little guidance for designing conservation auctions in practice.  
One aspect is that conservation auctions are usually repeated auctions and bids for the 
same ecological service on one site are invited in a sequence of various bidding rounds 
instead of a one-shot auction. This allows bidders to learn from the results of previous 
auctions and to adjust their bids (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988; Hailu and Schilizzi, 
2004). Also to be mentioned is the number of goods traded simultaneous and therefore 
we have to distinguish between single-unit auctions and multi-unit auctions (Kagel and 
Levin, 2001; Hailu and Thoyer, 2006). Auction theory mainly deals with the case of 
single-unit selling auctions, but conservation auctions are multi-unit procurement 
auctions and the administration selects various farmers with numerous heterogeneous 
sites to take part in the auction. Furthermore, it needs to be considered that conservation 
auctions can be used either as budget-constraint auctions or as target-constraint auctions 
(Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005). The budget-constraint auction is the usual case 
that agri-environmental schemes have a limited budget to spend and therefore applicants 
are accepted until the budget is exhausted. Another aspect of designing auctioning 
schemes is the question of whether a reserve price should be set. A reserve price is a 
price limit that defines the maximum amount that the administration is willing to accept 
(Stoneham et al., 2003; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  
 
2.2 The payment format 
To analyse bid values, standard auction theory has employed two basic models. In the 
private-value model each bidder has an individual knowledge about the value of the 
object in question. This value remains private information and is not revealed in the 
auctioning process. In contrast, in the common-value model the value of the object is 
equal for all bidders involved in the auction. However, the bidders have different private 
information about what that value actually is. In this case, bidders change their 
estimates if they learn other bidders’ signals via bids. In contrast, the values in the  
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private-value case would not change based on additional information by other bidders’ 
preferences or bids (Klemperer, 1999).  
Landholders in practise are assumed to have independent private values. This seems to 
encourage a single round of bidding in connection with the expectation that bids will be 
based on individual opportunity costs. But in practice the administration usually needs 
repeated auctions and a common-value element may easily arise; landholders might 
analyse the results of previous auctions and accordingly update their bids (Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997). As long as no official information on how the 
conservation agency values the sites with respect to their conservation value is 
available, the landholders will have different assumptions on the relative value of their 
land. 
In order to avoid the appropriation of information rents and collusion, it has to be 
considered carefully what kind of information will be given to bidders. Consequently 
and due to the fact that only sealed-bid auctions are of interest in this case, there are two 
basic payment formats to be used within repeated multi-unit auctions for ecological 
services. Both payment formats will now be briefly discussed, in particular regarding 
strategic incentives and the expected farmers’ bidding behaviour (McAfee and 
McMillian 1987; Milgrom, 1989; Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997; 
Cason and Gangadharan, 2004; Cason and Gangadharan, 2005; Stoneham et al., 2003; 
Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005):  
i.  In the uniform-price sealed bid auction a sealed bid is submitted by each bidder, 
stating the individual price for a specific ecological service. The good is then 
bought at a price determined by the price of the highest winning bid or the 
lowest rejected bid. All successful bids are paid equal. Thus the individual bid 
price just determines the probability of acceptance, but not the final payment. 
The optimal bidding strategy therefore is to reveal the accurate opportunity 
costs. 
ii.  In the discriminatory-price sealed bid auction also a sealed bid is submitted for 
every site, but all accepted bids are receiving payments according to the 
individual bid price. This creates incentives for bidders to bid a price above the 
individual opportunity costs and to ensure themselves information rents if the 
bid finally is successful.  
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The theory of budget-constrained auctions suggests that it is optimal for bidders in a 
discriminatory-price auction to overbid relative to their true costs of providing the 
ecological good (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Cason and 
Gangadharan, 2005). The bid curve does not therefore represent the true cost curve; it 
rather contains a rent for the bidder. Hence the supply curve is not identical within 
discriminatory-price auctions and uniform-price auctions, whereby the true opportunity 
costs, in theory, equal the bid prices within a uniform-price auction. The latter is based 
on the true marginal cost curve of environmental service provision, without a rent 
element. A discriminatory-price auction does thus reveal differences in opportunity 
costs, but only imperfectly so, because of the incentive to overbid.  
On the basis of theoretical considerations the payment format of a uniform-price auction 
seems to be the best choice since it creates no incentives for overbidding the individual 
opportunity costs. But particularly facing the practical considerations of a case study 
implementation some further aspects need to be considered.
1 
A main argument against uniform-price auctions, taken into account within the case 
study, is that farmers with low opportunity costs would benefit disproportional from a 
higher payment, because the strike price reflects the required compensation for owners 
of more productive sites. In contrast, a discriminatory-price auction does not pay 
landholders more than what they bid and the critical incentive on overbidding the 
individual opportunity costs in discriminatory-price auctions could be reduced to some 
degree by using flexible reserve prices or budget-constraints.  
Uniform pricing also seems to be more complex and more difficult to comprehend than 
the discriminatory-price auction. This may act as a barrier for farmers to participate, 
particularly within the first-time ever implementation of a conservation auction. In 
addition, uniform-price auctions expose bidders to greater risk as not only the 
acceptance probability is unknown but also the final payment.  
Moreover, it was expected in this small case study that within repeated uniform-price 
auctions bidders would learn the uniform price paid for successful bids in previous 
auctions and adjust their bids in the next auction. This kind of bidders’ learning will 
most probably lead to negative effects on the efficiency of the repeated auction 
performance and was decided to be avoided by any means in the field experiment. The 
argumentation is also based on findings by Cason et al. (2003). They used laboratory 
experiments to examine bidding behaviour in an auction when the value of the output 
                                                           
1 The discussion follows and complements Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005).  
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was known, compared with when it was not. The experiments indicate that when 
bidders did not know the value of output, their bids tended to be based on the 
opportunity costs. By contrast, when bidders were given information about the 
significance of their biodiversity assets, they tend to raise bids and secure themselves 
information rents. 
The choice between both payment formats is obviously controversial in practise. In the 
case study the discriminatory-price auction appealed to be the appropriate payment 
format against the background of repeated auctions as well as the objective of a high 
acceptance by farmers.  
 
 
3. Case study background 
3.1 Payment scheme and auction design 
The interdisciplinary payment scheme is a research programme, designed to reward 
environmental services in agriculture. It deals with the objectives of enhancing 
efficiency and acceptance of agri-environmental programmes by the use of an 
innovative market-orientation. Four main aspects make this transdisciplinary payment 
scheme different from actual programmes: It is outcome-based, decentralised according 
to the European principle of subsidiarity, market orientated by the use of auctioning and 
participatory by the integration of a regional advisory board.
2  
This paper basically deals with the aspect of market creation by the use of conservation 
auctions. Within the payment scheme regional-specific environmental goods of plant 
biodiversity – voluntary provided by the farmers – are rewarded as results of 
environmental services of agriculture. The prerequisite for a market-based support of 
environmental benefits is that ecological services need to be standardised according to 
their ecological quality and must meet certain conditions and requirements. This implies 
that ecological services are valuable goods and could be detected without complicated 
methods. Furthermore, the ecological goods should act as an indicator and – in addition 
to their actual usefulness – should imply positive effects on other natural resources.  
The overall objective is to reward landowners for their provision of environmental 
services, whereas the payment is – contrary to the majority of current agri-
environmental programmes in the EU – not based on actions undertaken by the farmers 
                                                           
2 The empirical work presented in this paper arises from research the author carried out at the Department 
for Agricultural Economics and Rural Development at the University of Goettingen in the time period 
2004-2006.  
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(Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003), but result-orientated, based on specify ecological 
services. These ecological services are defined as ecological goods of plant biodiversity 
(Bertke, 2005). Ecological goods have to be clearly defined by transparent floristic 
criteria, so farmers are able to prove their fulfilment and a justifiable control of the 
supplied ecological goods can take place as part of the payment scheme. In this case the 
production of the so-called ecological goods ‘grassland’ aims at the protection of 
regional endangered plant communities, the preservation of grassland on marginal sites 
and the promotion of species-rich grassland. Therefore the number of species per plot 
and a catalogue of grassland species that are adapted to extensive grassland 
management and characteristic for regional plant communities are suitable for the 
definition of ecological goods grassland. Related to the ecological quality the following 
three categories were defined: grassland I, grassland II and grassland III, whereas 
grassland III represents the highest quality of ecological services (Gerowitt et al., 2003; 
Bertke, 2005).  
The production of ecological goods shall achieve i) the maintenance of grassland on 
marginal sites, ii) the promotion of regional species-rich types of grassland and iii) the 
conservation of rare plant associations. Important is either the number of different 
species per control plot (circle with 2m radius = 12.6m²) as well as the existence of 
regional defined target species of extensive grasslands. The ecological goods and their 
represented ecological quality are defined as follows: grassland I: number of species >= 
8/12.6m²; grassland II: number of species >= 8/12.6m² + 2 target species; grassland III: 
number of species >= 8/12.6m² + 4 target species. The definition of the ecological 
goods grassland used in the case study is based on the work of Bertke (2005) and has 
been designed in a previous conceptual project period. 
From an economic point of view, the bid price per hectare is taken into account. The 
ecological evaluation is based on the quality of the produced ecological services 
represented by the classification grassland I, grassland II and grassland III. Thus within 
every category of ecological goods different prices are paid for the same quantity of a 
(heterogeneous) good based on the bid prices per hectare. 
The specific auction design is a repeated sealed-bid discriminatory-price multi-unit 
auction, with a separate budget-constraint for each quality of ecological goods. It 
therefore aims at budgetary cost-effectiveness as well as the possibility for the 
auctioneer to learn about differences of farmers’ opportunity costs revealed by 
individual bid prices for every grassland site. The regional demarcation corresponds to a  
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uniform exclusion border. To safeguard a high number of participants and low 
possibilities for collusion, all farmers were allowed to take part with all their grassland 
sites located in the case study area. In both auctions the same (potential) cohort of 
farmers was part of the field experiment mainly to learn about the bidding behaviour 
and the practical performance of repeated auctions as well as to collect data on further 
aspects not discussed in this paper (for example to measure the private transaction costs 
in both auctions). Furthermore, there was no possibility to run another auction in 
another case study area with different farmers and a changed auction design due to 
financial and organisational restrictions.  
Hence the bidders are bidding on one of three ecological goods, which are defined by 
the number of plant species targeted as well as the ecological quality of species specific 
to the region. If landowners do not exactly meet the ecological requirements of the 
ecological good the bid is targeted on, they will not be paid at all. Thereby it is left to 
the farmers to decide how to achieve the desired grassland I, II or III status. The results 
were assessed by a ground control on the grassland site at the end of the contract period. 
As part of the ground control the number and quality of different species were evaluated 
by counting them in control plots representative for the whole grassland site.
3 
Successful farmers got paid in both auctions. 
Since bidding behaviour is very sensitive to the type and amount of information 
communicated to farmers, no information except the definition of the ecological goods 
as part of the specification of services and the terms to be maintained was given to 
potential bidders in both auctions. The budget also was not pre-announced in both 
auctions and the potential bidders for the second auction were not informed about the 
highest accepted bid prices. They were only able to learn by the evaluation of their bids 
within the first auction. Due to the fact that both auctions were part of a research 




The case study enfolded two field auctions. Below the basic proceeding and the 
timetable of both auctions will be described.  
 
                                                           
3 The ground control was part of a separate work area within the research project and will not be 
examined in this paper.  
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I. The first auction (2004/2005) 
All conventional and ecological farmers with managed grassland sites in the model-
region were qualified to submitted bids within the first auction, starting in the beginning 
of June 2004. In June 2004 three information meetings were held to inform interested 
farmers about the basic procedure and the necessary documents. The deadline for 
submitting bids ended after six weeks and the bids were evaluated within one week. The 
contracts were closed in the middle of July 2004. According to the outcome-orientation, 
the ground control took place until the end of July 2005 and successful farmers got paid 
in August 2005.  
 
II. The second auction (2006) 
The basic auction design was the same within the second auction, except for a change 
that needed to be done due to a short-term safeguarding of the auction budget. This 
adaptation refers to the circle of eligible farmers and the auction was limited to those 
farmers already participated in the first auction. Therefore, the documents were 
immediately sent to the relevant farmers in the middle of February 2006. The bids had 
to be received until the end of March 2006 and were evaluated in one week. The ground 
control took place by the end of July 2006 and after a successful control, the farmers got 
paid in August 2006. 
 
Due to the involvement of the auctions in a research project and resulting restrictions, 
the contract period was one year or shorter and not five years, as usual in agri-
environment schemes. Therefore the aspect of windfall profits might be discussed, but 
since the payment scheme is result-orientated, corresponding criticism should be small; 
but still kept in mind. 
 
4. Results – auction performance 
4.1 Submitted and successful bids 
To participate, landowners had to submit an individual bid for every grassland site, 
whereas every farmer was qualified to submit a various number of bids for all categories 
of ecological services. Main results of the case auctions area are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Results of both auctions for the ecological goods grassland I, II and III 
(submitted bids)  
 1
st auction (2004/2005) 2
nd auction (2006) 
Grassland I    
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- Range of prices in €/ha   40 – 250 (Ø 100.92; SD 47.18) 25 – 160 (Ø  93.94; SD 29.47)
- Number of sites  130 216 
- Hectare  221.16 340.65 
- Number of farmers 27 26 
Grassland II   
- Range of prices in €/ha  55 – 300 (Ø 141.75; SD 59.55) 75 – 300 (Ø 147.67; SD 46.92)
- Number of sites  32 56 
- Hectare  53.33 82.58 
- Number of farmers 16 18 
Grassland III   
- Range of prices in €/ha  100 – 350 (Ø 202.78; SD 78.73) 150 – 450 (Ø 257.35; SD 89.34)
- Number of sites  18 23 
- Hectare  36.98 31.61 
- Number of farmers 8 7 
 Source: own. Note: Ø = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
 
The offer includes the choice of the ecological good (grassland I, grassland II or 
grassland III), the calculation of the price per hectare as well as the description of the 
grassland site. Analysing the wide ranges and standard deviations of individual bid 
prices within each category of ecological goods and both auctions, it becomes clear that 
the farmers were confronted with different opportunity cost for the provision of an in 
each case equal quality of ecological services. Within currently used fixed price 
payment schemes in the European agri-environmental policy these cost differentials 
remain unknown to the administration and could therefore not be considered for 
conservation contracting.  
Looking at the development from the first to the second auction, the range of prices 
expanded only within the highest quality of ecological services – the ecological goods 
grassland III. For both ecological goods grassland II and grassland I the range of prices 
decreased on small scale and for the latter the influence of the strike price on bidders’ 
learning becomes apparent. In the first auction all bids up to a price of €145 per hectare 
were accepted for the ecological goods grassland I. In the second auction especially the 
former rejected farmers learned and either reduced the bid prices or – if a reduction of 
the bid prices was not possible due to higher opportunity costs – did not supply the 
specific grassland site again. Thus the highest bid price in the second auction was 
adjusted to €160 per hectare. Furthermore, the above findings on submitted bids show 
that even if the range of prices decreased for the ecological goods grassland I and 
(slightly) for the ecological goods grassland II, there is still no collusion with negative 
monetary effects. As expected, the price level increased within both auctions from good 
grassland I about good grassland II up to good grassland III. 
Finally, the development of the number of bids as well as the number of participating 
farmers from 2004/2005 to 2006 will be included. It becomes obvious that the number  
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of sites (the number of bids) especially arose for the relatively lowest quality of 
ecological services, but also within all other classes of ecological goods. It this case it 
needs to be mentioned that in consequence of changing the auction design in 2006 the 
number of eligible farmers was limited to those farmers who had already participated in 
the first auction. Hence the increase of submitted bids from the first to the second 
auction can be interpreted as a rising acceptance of auctioning as a new policy 
instrument.  
 
Besides the submitted bids, the paper will now turn to answer the question what kind of 
bids could finally be accepted. Therefore the most important results of the successful 
bids are presented in table 2 for both auctions and all three categories of ecological 
goods. Firstly, it needs to be remembered that both auctions are budget-constraint 
auctions with no reserve price and therefore the main influence on the number of 
accepted bids is the budget-restriction for every ecological good. The total budget 
restriction of €30,000 for the first auction was basically decided to be spend on two-
thirds (€20,000) for the ecological goods grassland I and both on one-sixth (€5,000) for 
the ecological goods grassland II and grassland III, but with the option of shifting some 
of the budget to higher-quality goods, depending on the number and size of sites. For 
the second auction a total budget of €26,000 was available and this time the budget was 
decided to be spent equally (about €8,667) for all three ecological goods.  
In consequence of the total budget-restriction of €30,000 not all bids of the total amount 
of €33,747.91 could be accepted within the first auction. Finally, 159 sites by 28 
farmers – covering an area of 288.56 hectare – were taken under contract. With a total 
bid sum of €51,481.23 the budget-restriction of €26,000 was also exceeded in the 
second auction and therefore altogether 164 sites by 21 farmers were accepted. This 
covers species-rich grassland of 238.46 hectare. 
  
Table 2. Results of both auctions for the ecological goods grassland I, II and III 
(successful bids) 
 1
st auction (2004/2005) 2
nd auction (2006) 
Grassland I   
- Range of prices in €/ha  40 – 145 (Ø  84.59; SD 26.45) 25 – 90 (Ø  66.86; SD 15.56)
- Number of sites  109 89 
- Hectare  198.25 130.05 
- Number of farmers  20 10 
Grassland II   
- Range of prices in €/ha  55 – 300 (Ø 141.75; SD 59.55) 75 – 200 (Ø 137.87; SD 30.92)
- Number of sites  32 52 
- Hectare  53.33 76.80 
- Number of farmers  16 17  
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Grassland III   
- Range of prices in €/ha  100 – 350 (Ø 202.78; SD 78.73) 150 – 450 (Ø 257.35; SD 89.34)
- Number of sites  18 23 
- Hectare  36.98 31.61 
- Number of farmers  8 7 
 Source: own. Note: Ø = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
 
Looking at the price ranges and standard deviations of the successful bids and their 
relevance for the final payment, the results clarify a still wide difference between 
individual bid prices and thus the consequences of discriminatory-price auctions for the 
final design of conservation contracting.  
The additional analysis of accepted bid price levels in both auctions also shows an 
increase from the ecological goods grassland I about the ecological goods grassland II 
up to the ecological goods grassland III. From the first to the second auction the price 
level decreased both for the ecological goods grassland I and grassland II mainly due to 
an adjustment by reducing the specific budget-constraint.  
On the other hand, the price level and the highest successful bid-price per hectare for the 
peak quality of biodiversity – represented by the ecological goods grassland III – 
increased from the first to the second auction. This development is caused by the 
adjustment of the subdividing of the total budget-restriction on the three categories of 
ecological goods in the second auction. As a reaction concerning an unexpected high 
amount of bids for the ecological goods grassland III in the first auction, the specific 
budget-restriction and the valuation of the highest-quality grassland sites was enhanced 
absolutely as well as compared to the remaining two classes of ecological goods.  
Due to the fact that the whole budget was spend for every ecological good, a 
comparison of table 1 and table 2 suggests that there was no real competition for the 
grassland II and III contracts, since all applicants but one won a contract. This must 
have had a negative effect on bidding behaviour, especially compared to grassland I 
contracts for which there was a lot of competition. To avoid this rise of accepted bid 
prices and to increase competition among farmers, a reserve price of for example €300 
per hectare should have been used for grassland III. But based on controversial 
discussions within the research project the idea of using reserve prices – at least in the 
second auction and based on the results of the first auction as well as other information 
– was rejected by the majority, bringing forward the argument that the main objective 
should be to take as much high-quality grassland sites under contract as possible; 
without considering a potential rise in prices and less budgetary cost-effectiveness. This  
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needs to be mentioned as a challenge of interdisciplinary decision making and as a 
problem or restriction within the case study auctions. 
 
4.2 Efficiency gains by auctioning compared to fixed flat-rate payments 
Besides the analysis of bids and especially bid prices per hectare, practical efficiency 
gains by auctioning instead of fixed flat-rate payments in the model-region will be 
discussed.  
It is important to remember that the opportunity cost curve is the relevant supply curve 
when a fixed flat-rate payment is offered. Then all landowners with opportunity costs 
below the fixed payment gain from participating in the payment scheme. The marginal 
participant is the one whose opportunity cost is equal to the payment rate offered. Thus, 
under the fixed-price scheme, Xfix hectare of species rich grassland will be traded at the 
price Pfix (figure 1). The total budget-constraint is represented by the area 0ABXfix. 
Under a discriminatory-price auction, the ordered bids represent the supply curve, not 
the opportunity cost curve. The auction therefore creates incentives for landowners to 
shade their bids above their true opportunity costs and thereby to secure themselves an 
information rent. Bidders are accepted in the order of their bids until the budget is 
exhausted. The budget-constraint is represented by the area 0DCXauc. Assuming the 
same budget as under the fixed-price scheme, Xauc hectare of species rich grassland can 
be taken under contract. The cost-effectiveness of the auction thus depends on the 
degree of bid shading. One would normally expect bid shading to be low and the 
auction to be superior to the fixed-price scheme. However, if bidders learn the bid caps 
from previous auctions, bid shading can result in poor auction performance. Figure 1 
shows the example of how a discriminatory-price auction is more cost-effective than a 
fixed-price scheme for the same given budget, whereby linear instead of convex cost 
curves are assumed for reasons of a simplified illustration. 
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical cost-effectiveness of a discriminatory-price auction vs. a fixed 





















Source: own, based on Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005. 
The evaluation of efficiency gains of the auction vis-à-vis a fixed-price scheme 
therefore should be done against a supply curve reflecting true marginal costs. An 
auction does reveal differences in opportunity costs, but only imperfectly so. Because of 
incentive to overbid, the true opportunity costs could not be identified within the case 
study and remain subject to asymmetric information – and thus unknown to the author – 
in any field experiment. An appropriate comparison of the auction performance and a 
fixed-price scheme thus is difficult, based on data generated by field experiments. A 
precise comparison requires the use of laboratory experiments where the true marginal 
costs are perfectly controlled for and known to the experimenter. These limitations 
should be considered for the latter of this section.  
If we assume that the bid prices within the case study auctions are equal to the true 
opportunity costs, a comparison with a fixed flat-rate payment scheme will at least give 
a clue on efficiency gains by the use of auctioning. 
Due to the specific auction design (outcome orientation, definition of the ecological 
goods grassland I, grassland II and grassland III) it needs to be considered that – at the 
time the case study took place – no agri-environmental programme exactly fits to the 
ecological goal of the case study auctions. Therefore the ‘Lower Saxony agri-
environmental programme, measure B: support of extensive grassland use’ 
[Niedersächsische Agrarumweltprogramme, Maßnahme B: Förderung extensiver 
Grünlandnutzung] will be consulted. This support of an extensive use of grassland fits 
best to the ecological good grassland I, whereas the latter even represents a higher  
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ecological quality because the auction rewards an extensive use of grassland sites plus 
the proof of a specific amount of plant biodiversity indicated by eight different species. 
By the time the case study took place, farmers where paid within the agri-environmental 
programme by a fixed payment of €103 per hectare. In the remainder of the section the 
budget spent within both auctions will be compared to the budget that would have been 
needed to take same area under contract by using the flat-rate payment. Thereby the 
impact on practical efficiency gains by the use of auctioning will be discussed. Farmers 
participating in the case study were not allowed to take part in the agri-environmental 
programme with grassland sites taken under contract within the auction. 
 
In the first auction (2004/2005) 198.25 hectare were taken under contract, whereas the 
relevant budget sums up to €16,100.84. To achieve the equivalent area by using a fixed 
payment of €103 per hectare a total budget of €20,419.75 would have been needed. 
Auctioning does in this case lead to savings of €4,318.91 or in other words efficiency 
gains of 21.2%.  
The similar comparison for the second auction approves, and even strengthens, this 
positive evaluation. Using the fixed payment of €103 per hectare, a budget of 
€13,395.15 must be paid to realise the ecological goal of 130.05 hectare grassland taken 
under contract in 2006. In contrast this objective has been achieved by auctioning with a 
budget of €8,527.30, which equals savings of €4,867.85 or 36.3%.  
To sum up under consideration of all unavoidable empirical inaccuracy, these results 
point out the specific real-life economic potential of auctioning and support the 




As agri-environmental agencies in Europe and around the world look for more efficient 
ways of contracting landowners for the provisions of ecological services, some clear 
conclusions emerge from this case study. Even if the auctioning scheme is a 
comparatively simple case study, the results are sufficient to point out a potential for a 
more efficient spending of public funds compared to traditional measures in 
environmental and biodiversity conservation policy. Keeping in mind the empirical 
difficulties of field experiments in comparison to laboratory experiments, the empirical 
work indicates cost advantages of auctioning in comparison to fixed flat-rate payment  
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schemes of up to 36%, depending on which scenario is chosen as reference. These 
findings as well as a relative high number of farmers participating in the case study 
point out that auctioning conservation contracts became popular with landowner and 
that the topic of biodiversity conservation turned from a primary complex and 
somewhat diffuse idea to practical actions and monetary incentives for farmers. 
Still there is little evidence about the efficiency gains of auctions compared to payment 
schemes using fixed-prices. Furthermore, reported results on cost-effectiveness gains 
greatly vary as for example Stoneham et al. (2003) mention that the first auction within 
the BushTender trial had lead to an amount of biodiversity that would have cost up to 
seven times more if a fixed-price payment scheme had been used instead of the auction. 
A simulation of farmers’ bidding behaviour within a hypothetical payment scheme 
auctioning conservation contracts by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) 
points out efficiency gains – depending on the auction design – from 16% to 29%. 
Within the Catchment Care Program as part of the National Market-based Instruments 
Pilot Program in Australia an auction for biodiversity and water quality – ones in place 
– is expected to be between 23% and 34% more cost-effective than the former fixed 
price scheme (National Market Based Instruments Working Group, 2005). An 
evaluation of the Central Scotland Forest and Grampian Challenge Fund for the 
Forestry Commission Scotland by CJC Consulting (2004) reports efficiency gains in the 
range of 33% to 36%. Therefore the results from this case study fit well to cost-
effectiveness gains mentioned for the Central Scotland Forest and Grampian Challenge 
Fund (CJC Consulting, 2004) as well as for the Catchment Care Program (National 
Market Based Instruments Working Group, 2005).  
Even though the case study presented in this paper had yielded promising results while 
a real life repeated auctioning format was successfully implemented, there are also 
critical lessons to be learned and to be considered to improve upcoming conservation 
auctions. One main aspect is the fact that the ecological quality was measured within the 
case study by the number of different species and the use of specific classifications of 
ecological goods. This very simple way of evaluating the value of plant biodiversity 
was necessary since the first time ever implementation of the payment scheme had to be 
simple. But this categorisation of output quality needs to be criticised for several 
reasons, as follows. The bid valuation based on the number and quality of different 
species and the bid price per hectare i) disregards other more differentiated and 
important criteria, ii) there is no clear linkage between the amount of plant biodiversity  
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and the final payment, iii) the bid valuation is not representative for the needs of the 
majority of conservation schemes and iv) the bid valuation does not use a reserve price 
as a maximum bid price to be paid. A promising solution to resolve these problems, and 
meet the practical requirements of most repeated conservation auctions, seems to be the 
use of an environmental index.  
Thus the author is currently working on additional aspects in the field of auctioning 
conservation contracts. This short-term research mainly comprises of a worldwide 
comparative study of conservation auctions, the question of how to deal with 
information and ecological stock dynamics within repeated conservation auctions under 
uncertainty as well as the development of a specific environmental benefits index for 
plant biodiversity. Thereby, it also needs to be analysed, in which circumstances 
auctioning is not feasible or will not lead to efficiency gains and a payment scheme only 
using fixed prices or a combination of both instruments is the appropriate way within 
the European agri-environmental policy for the period 2007 to 2013 and beyond. 
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